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INTRODUCTION
More than thirty years ago, historian of technology Melvin Kranzberg put
forward his famous “First Law”: “Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it
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neutral.”1 By this he meant to combat technological determinism, by which a
particular technology has a “good” or “bad” essence that dictated its adoption by
and effect on society. But Kranzberg’s law also cautioned against technological
utopianism, the illusion that society can maintain full instrumental control of
technology.
A stark illustration of Kranzberg’s first law is modern information and
communications technology. The Internet and its ecosystem of connected devices
have profoundly altered individual and social life, including those aspects that are
the topic of this symposium: the intersection of gender, law, and technology.
Technology has enabled new forms of gender- and sexual-based crime and has
frequently made it harder to prosecute those who commit sexual assault. Yet in
many cases technology has also served as a shield for victims, getting them help and
protecting their privacy. These effects, both negative and positive, have been of the
unintended variety, as society grapples to adapt to technological change it does not
fully understand. The Internet and its outgrowths have been neither good nor bad;
but neither have they been neutral.
Of particular importance has been ubiquitous strong encryption, one of the
core technologies underpinning digital life. Since its adoption by business and the
public in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the issue of law-enforcement access to
encrypted data has been hotly debated in the legal, policy, and technology
communities.2 After a decade and a half of relative peace, the “crypto wars” have
started up again.3 The issue has seen a revival in legal scholarship,4 and it is also

1. Melvin Kranzberg, Technology and History: “Kranzberg’s Laws,” 27 TECH. & CULTURE 544,
545 (1986).
2. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip,
and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995).
3. The “crypto wars” is the common name for an intense period of policy debate in the 1990s
between the government, Silicon Valley, and civil society over whether there should be any limits on
the availability of strong encryption and, in particular, whether encryption systems should be designed
to permit court-authorized government access to encrypted data. See Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad,
Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 433–41 (2012).
4. See, e.g., ASHLEY DEEKS, HOOVER INSTITUTION, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DYNAMICS
OF ENCRYPTION, Aegis Series Paper No. 1609 (2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/
international-legal-dynamics-encryption [https://perma.cc/SMY2-GK4F]; Justin (Gus) Hurwitz,
EncryptionCongress mod (Apple + CALEA), 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 355 (2017); Geoffrey S. Corn, Averting
the Inherent Dangers of “Going Dark”: Why Congress Must Require a Locked Front Door to Encrypted
Data, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1433 (2015) [hereinafter Averting the Inherent Dangers]; Geoffrey S. Corn,
Encryption, Asymmetric Warfare, and the Need for Lawful Access, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 337
(2017); Jamil N. Jaffer & Daniel J. Rosenthal, Decrypting Our Security: A Bipartisan Argument for a
Rational Solution to the Encryption Challenge, 24 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 273 (2016); Orin S. Kerr &
Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 GEO. L.J. 989 (2018); Eric Manpearl, Preventing Going
Dark: A Sober Analysis and Reasonable Solution to Preserve Security in the Encryption Debate, 28
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2017); David W. Opderbeck, Encryption Policy and Law Enforcement in
the Cloud, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1657 (2017); Stephanie K. Pell, You Can’t Always Get What You Want:
How Will Law Enforcement Get What It Needs in a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption
Era?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 599 (2016); Swire & Ahmad, supra note 3.
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salient in the policy arena, prompting high-profile reports from law-enforcement
organizations,5 information security researchers,6 policy analysts,7 and multiple
branches of government,8 including proposed legislation on all sides of the issue,9
at both the federal and state levels.10
This Article seeks to advance the debate around government access to
encrypted data. Part I explains how encryption secures communications and data;
how it helps protect victims of crime; and how it impedes law enforcement,
particularly at the state and local levels. Part II, the analytical core of the Article,
introduces the public-policy literature on “wicked problems” to explain why the
encryption issue is such a difficult one. Part III suggests some changes to policy and
institutional design.
This Article aims at several audiences. The first is those—whether in the legal
academy, government, industry, civil society, or the information-security
community—who are working on the issue of law-enforcement access to encrypted
data. We are in a critical period for this issue: public opinion is split on whether

5. See, e.g., INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, DATA, PRIVACY AND PUBLIC SAFETY: A LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE CHALLENGES OF GATHERING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
(2015); MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, THIRD REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION (2017) [hereinafter MANHATTAN DA
REPORT].
6. Harold Abelson et al., Keys Under Doormats: Mandating Insecurity by Requiring Government
Access to All Data and Communications, 1 J. CYBERSECURITY 69 (2015).
7. BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD UNIV., DON’T PANIC: MAKING
PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE (2016) [hereinafter DON’T PANIC]; THE CHERTOFF
GRP., THE GROUND TRUTH ABOUT ENCRYPTION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXTRAORDINARY
ACCESS (2016); CHARLES DUAN ET AL., POLICY APPROACHES TO THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE
(R. Street Policy Study No. 133, 2018); EASTWEST INST., ENCRYPTION POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC
REGIMES: FINDING CONVERGENT PATHS AND BALANCED SOLUTIONS (2018); JAMES A. LEWIS ET
AL., CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE EFFECT OF ENCRYPTION ON
LAWFUL ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA (2017).
8. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., DECRYPTING THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE: A
FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION MAKERS (2018) [hereinafter NASEM ENCRYPTION REPORT]; HOUSE
COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., GOING DARK, GOING FORWARD: A PRIMER ON THE ENCRYPTION
DEBATE (2016); ANALYTIC EXCHANGE PROGRAM, GOING DARK: IMPACT TO INTELLIGENCE AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THREAT MITIGATION (2017).
9. Compare Cody M. Poplin, Burr-Feinstein Encryption Legislation Officially Released, LAWFARE
(Apr. 13, 2016, 6:12 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/burr-feinstein-encryption-legislationofficially-released [ https://perma.cc/F7JV-A2MR ] (describing legislation that would effectively ban
encryption that did not provide exceptional access), with David Ruiz, The Secure Data Act Would Stop
Backdoors, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 10, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/
05/secure-data-act-would-stop-backdoors [ https://perma.cc/3BGD-AF82 ], and Dustin Volz,
U.S. Lawmakers Seek to Bar States from Mandating Encryption Weaknesses, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2016,
2:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-encryption/u-s-lawmakers-seek-to-barstates-from-mandating-encryption-weaknesses-idUSKCN0VJ0VI [ https://perma.cc/7VCL-RGKV ].
10. See Andy Greenberg, Proposed State Bans on Phone Encryption Make Zero Sense, WIRED
( Jan. 26, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/proposed-state-bans-on-phoneencryption-make-zero-sense [ https://perma.cc/7K88-776U ] (describing proposed California and
New York legislation that would restrict encryption).
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companies should design their systems to permit law-enforcement access;11
technology companies can no longer assume a hands-off, deregulatory
environment;12 and the looming specter of foreign regulation from liberal and
autocratic regimes alike gives the government and Silicon Valley an incentive to
resolve the encryption issue one way or the other, thereby setting a global
precedent.13 My hope is that this article will nudge the discussion away from
oppositional, all-or-nothing analyses of short-term proposals and toward a higherlevel, longer-term approach that can find common ground among the various sides.
Another audience this Article addresses is scholars who study the intersection
of gender, equality, and technology. For these scholars, I hope my account will
usefully inform them of an important technological dimension to how the internet
and other communications and computing technology can both undergird and
undermine attempts to end gender and sexual crime.
Finally, this Article speaks to scholars of administrative law and regulatory
theory. In particular, I hope my discussion of wicked problems provides a novel
and useful lens through which administrative-law scholars think about how to
grapple with today’s biggest regulatory challenges.14
I. ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY
Much has been written about how encryption can both support and
undermine public safety,15 so I will keep my discussion of this issue short. I first
give a brief definition of encryption and the associated issue of exceptional access,
third-party access to decrypted data or communications. I then discuss how
encryption can improve public safety, focusing (given the topic of this symposium)
on how encryption can help victims of sexual and gender violence. I conclude by

11. See Aaron Smith, Americans and Cybersecurity: 3. Attitudes About Cybersecurity Policy, PEW
RES. CTR. ( Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/3-attitudes-about-cybersecuritypolicy [ https://perma.cc/BR6Q-2Z3U ] (“Americans remain divided over whether government should
be able to access encrypted communications.”).
12. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Silicon Valley’s Regulatory Exceptionalism Comes to an End,
LAWFARE (Mar. 23, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/silicon-valleys-regulatoryexceptionalism-comes-end [ https://perma.cc/YV79-QW4Q ].
13. See DEEKS, supra note 4, at 18 (“There is likely a modest first-mover advantage to be gained
by deciding the US position [encryption] quickly and promoting that position . . . .”); Hurwitz, supra
note 4, at 417 (“If the United States engages in a serious discussion about possible approaches to
regulating encryption today, the discussions we have will have some ability to set standards and
moderate approaches set elsewhere . . . .”).
14. I am not the first to use the “wicked problems” framework in a legal setting. See, e.g., Richard
J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009); Sharon Lewis, The Tissue Issue: A Wicked Problem, 48 JURIMETRICS
J. 193 (2008). Nevertheless, its use is sporadic in the literature, and my hope is that this Article will
contribute to its adoption as part of the legal analyst’s toolkit. Cf. WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL
ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW (2007).
15. For a balanced overview, see NASEM ENCRYPTION REPORT, supra note 8, at 27–39.
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describing how encryption can pose challenges for public safety, in particular by
thwarting law-enforcement investigations at the federal, state, and local levels.
A. Encryption and Exceptional Access
In order to cryptographically secure data, both the sender and recipient of the
communication (or, in the case of stored data, the user at the time they encrypt the
data and when they later seek to decrypt it) must jointly know some shared piece of
secret information, referred to as the key.16 The process of generating and sharing
the key, known as the problem of secure key exchange, is a complex one. To make
their devices and services user-friendly, companies that build encryption into their
products also handle secure key exchange behind the scenes. For example, when
you set up a passcode or fingerprint on an iPhone, you are providing information
that the iPhone uses to generate the key that will encrypt the device when you lock
it and then decrypt the device when you unlock it. Similarly, when you register for
a WhatsApp account, WhatsApp generates a key, known only to you (specifically,
to the WhatsApp program on your various devices) that allows you to communicate
securely with others.
When companies design their cryptographic systems—specifically the details
of how they handle secure key exchange—they have to decide whether or not to
keep a copy of the key or some other means, independent of the user, to decrypt
the information. If they don’t keep a copy, then only the user (and their intended
recipient) can decrypt the resulting encrypted data. If, by contrast, the company
keeps a copy of the key—or builds the system with a “backdoor” so that any device
or application can be accessed, under certain circumstances, by the company—then
the data can be decrypted by the company, for its own purposes or on behalf of the
government or some other third party. This capability is known as exceptional access.17
There are good reasons for companies to build exceptional access into their
systems; it allows them to provide their users with useful features like malware
scanning, password recovery, and text prediction. But for law enforcement the key
benefit is that the companies can decrypt data or provide access to locked devices
in response to government orders.
As discussed in more detail below,18 the problem is that, all else being equal, a
system without exceptional access is more secure than the same system that allows
exceptional access (whether by the government, the company that designed the
system, or someone else). This tradeoff between government access and

16. Public-key cryptography (for example, RSA) allows for encrypted communications
without a shared secret. However, public-key cryptography requires substantially more computation
than does symmetric cryptography (which requires both parties to have access to the same key), and
so bulk data is normally encrypted using symmetric encryption. See KEITH M. MARTIN, EVERYDAY
CRYPTOGRAPHY 21–24, 178–80 (2d ed. 2017).
17. See NASEM ENCRYPTION REPORT, supra note 8, at 15.
18. See infra Part III.A.1.
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information security is at the core of the roiling public debate over
encryption policy.
B. Encryption as a Tool for Victims of Crime
Encryption is an important tool for individuals seeking to protect themselves
from a variety of threats to their finances, privacy, or safety. In keeping with the
theme of this symposium, I offer several examples of how encryption can help
protect individuals from sexual and gender crime, but it’s important to emphasize
that these same benefits apply to other use cases.
By keeping data inaccessible to third parties, encryption can thwart would-be
abusers. As the National Network to End Domestic Violence notes:
[An abuse victim’s] smartphone is often one of the first things an abuser
will target simply because of the amount of information on there. If they
can compromise the victim’s smartphone, they have access to all phone
calls, messages, social media, email, location information, and much more.
For these reasons, smartphone security and encryption is essential to
safeguarding the privacy of victims’ personal information.19
Similarly, domestic-abuse victims can use encrypted messaging applications
like WhatsApp to securely talk to supportive family or friends, without their abuser
knowing.
Encryption can also help prevent violations of a broad range of what Danielle
Keats Citron has called “sexual privacy”: “access to . . . information about . . . our
bodies, sexual and gender identities, and intimate activities.”20 For example,
encryption can help secure devices that store intimate pictures and videos, thus
helping prevent “revenge porn.” In the future, “deep fakes”—“hyper-realistic
digital falsification of images, video, and audio,”21 often used to create nonconsensual pornography—might be countered with “immutable life logs,” which
would use encryption to “make it possible for a victim of a deep fake to produce a
certified alibi credibly proving that he or she did not do or say the thing depicted.”22
C. Encryption as a Tool for Criminals
At the same time that encryption can act as a shield against sexual and gender
crime, it can also help facilitate such crime, both by helping abusers remain

19. Smartphone Encryption: Protecting Victim Privacy While Holding Offenders Accountable,
TECHNOLOGY SAFETY (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.techsafety.org/blog/2016/4/12/smartphoneencryption-protecting-victim-privacy-while-holding-offenders-accountable [ https://perma.cc/HC87JWMU ].
20. Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870 (2019).
21. Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4), https://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3213954 [ https://perma.cc/3FXE-TEZ2 ].
22. Id. at 54.
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anonymous and by making it harder for law enforcement to investigate them.
Investigations into sexual and general crimes are only a subtype of those that can
be stymied by encryption, but they are well represented. For example, in the
burgeoning caselaw on whether the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination applies to a defendant’s disclosure of phone or computer passcodes,
investigations into child pornography and sex trafficking present a common fact
pattern.23 Encryption can frustrate investigations into violent crimes, including
sexual assault24 and sex trafficking.25 And it can even affect the government’s
highest-priority activities: end-to-end encryption on popular communications
services like WhatsApp and FaceTime may have hindered Special Counsel Robert
Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.26
It is impossible to know the precise extent to which encryption frustrates lawenforcement investigations, both because law-enforcement agencies are only
beginning to collect accurate statistics, and because one can never be sure of how
an investigation would have proceeded in the absence of encryption. But the topline conclusion is clear: as a report by the National Academies notes, “widespread
encryption is having a serious and growing negative impact on the ability of law
enforcement to collect relevant plaintext [i.e., unencrypted data].”27 For example,
the FBI estimates that it has over a thousand encrypted smartphones in evidence
that it cannot access due to encryption.28 From 2014 to 2017 the Manhattan District

23. See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, No. 17-CR-00259-CRB-1, 2018 WL 1964588, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2018); United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 2017);
United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011), 670 F.3d 1335,
1339 (11th Cir. 2012); Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540, 541 (2019). The issue has recently
generated substantial scholarly attention. See, e.g., Aloni Cohen & Sunoo Park, Compelled Decryption and
the Fifth Amendment: Exploring the Technical Boundaries, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 169 (2018); Laurent
Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 203
(2018); Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
97 TEX. L. REV. 767 (2019).
24. MANHATTAN DA REPORT, supra note 5, at 8.
25. Ellen Wulfhorst, Technology Use by Sex Traffickers Fuels Debate Between Privacy and Security,
REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trafficking-conferencetechnology-idUSKBN17R2UI [ https://perma.cc/2XX9-SHLC ].
26. See Craig Timberg & Drew Harwell, How WhatsApp, FaceTime and Other Encryption
Apps Shaped the Outcome of the Mueller Report, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/19/how-whatsapp-facetime-otherencryption-apps-shaped-outcome-mueller-report/ [ https://perma.cc/S7BB-27S7 ].
27. NASEM ENCRYPTION REPORT, supra note 8, at 42.
28. The FBI initially estimated that it had nearly eight thousand such devices, but later realized
that this figure was inflated more than fivefold due to errors. See Devil Barrett, FBI Repeatedly
Overstated Encryption Threat Figures to Congress, Public, WASH. POST (May 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-repeatedly-overstated-encryptionthreat-figures-to-congress-public/2018/05/22/5b68ae90-5dce-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html
[https://perma.cc/KWW6-MXJS]; Henry Farrell, The FBI Blunder on Phone Encryption, Explained,
WASH. POST (May 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/
30/the-fbi-blunder-on-phone-encryption-explained [ https://perma.cc/U5ZH-5C77 ].
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Attorney’s Office seized over two thousand encrypted smartphones.29 And state
and local law-enforcement agencies across the country have experienced similar
problems accessing encrypted data.30 Nor is the problem limited to the United
States. Governments around the world have struggled to access encrypted data, to
the point that some countries have proposed laws that would mandate provider
assistance with decryption.31
The impact of encryption on ordinary law-enforcement investigations has
often been overshadowed by its hypothetical effects on foreign intelligence and
national security. For example, the controversy over the government’s attempt to
force Apple to help it unlock the iPhone of one of the San Bernardino terrorists
involved a federal agency (the FBI) investigating a high-profile national-security
incident (the San Bernardino terrorist attacks).32 Government officials continue to
highlight the use of encrypted communications by terrorists. For example, when
FBI Director Christopher Wray testified before Congress in late 2017, the first
encryption-related example he gave was of FBI “agents and analysts . . . increasingly
finding that communications and contacts between groups like ISIS and potential
recruits occur in encrypted private messaging platforms.”33
Encryption can certainly make it harder for national-security and foreignintelligence agencies to do their jobs, but its effect in those contexts is likely to be
limited. The universe of national-security and foreign-intelligence targets is small
relative to the resources and expertise of the federal government. With enough
effort, the government’s “three-letter agencies” (like the FBI, the NSA, or the CIA)
can likely hack their way into even the most sophisticated adversary’s systems (or,
as occurred in the San Bernardino case, purchase third-party tools that do the same).
Instead, encryption poses the largest danger to investigations into “ordinary”
crime, especially that which falls under the jurisdiction of state or local law
enforcement, which may lack the resources or expertise to get around sophisticated
encryption. As the Manhattan DA’s Office has argued, “[b]ecause obtaining
[encrypted] evidence is extremely costly in the expanding ‘lawful hacking’

29.
30.

MANHATTAN DA REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY: AN UPDATE TO THE
NOVEMBER 2015 REPORT 10–11 (2016).
31. For example, a recent Australian law allows the government to issue compulsory “technical
capability notices” that would obligate providers to redesign their systems so as to help the government
decrypt information, although such notices would not cover design changes to “remov[e] one or more
forms of electronic protection that are or were applied by, or on behalf of, the provider.”
Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (Austl.),
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018A00148 [ https://perma.cc/LJ94-MQDU ].
32. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 102–03 (2018).
33. Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the House
Homeland Security Committee: Keeping America Secure in the New Age of Terror (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/keeping-america-secure-in-the-new-age-of-terror [ https://
perma.cc/65W3-U6H9 ].
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marketplace, . . . it is available only in cases handled by a small minority of wellfunded agencies. Crime victims thus have unequal access to justice, depending on
the resources of the city or county in which they live.”34 Conversely, the majority of
criminals are likely to stick with commercially available software rather than deploy
their own sophisticated encryption systems.35 Thus, were the government able to
convince the major technology companies to build exceptional access into their
systems, such access might provide a large return in the form of increased lawenforcement effectiveness.
II. ENCRYPTION AS A WICKED PROBLEM
As this section will demonstrate, the issue of encrypted-data access is best
conceptualized as a “wicked” problem that requires a special approach, and a special
set of institutions, to solve.
A. Introduction to Wicked Problems
Although wicked problems are as old as social organization itself, their unique
characteristics were first formalized in the 1960s and ‘70s.36 There are many
competing definitions of “wicked” problems, but the definition that first appeared
in the planning and public-policy literatures remains a good starting place: that “class
of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is
confusing, where there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values,
and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing.”37
One way of understanding the nature of wicked problems is to compare them
to their opposite, “tame” problems.38 Although tame problems may be difficult to
solve and require complex analysis, they are in principle solvable. For example,
imagine the problem of building a bridge over a river. Physically constructing the
bridge is a tame problem. Once the design specifications are set, the builder can use
a set of well-developed construction processes to build the bridge. The problems of
pouring concrete and placing girders are well-understood; the goals are clear;
insights gained in one project can be translated to the next; there is a clear end-point
(the bridge is built); there are clear success criteria (the bridge doesn’t fall down);
and the problem is relatively self-contained (you don’t need to solve environmental,
transportation, or distributional public-policy problems to build the bridge).
Now compare the process of building the bridge with that of designing
it: determining where it should be located, what transportation options it should
provide (cars, busses, trains, pedestrians, cyclists), whether to charge fees for its use,
34. MANHATTAN DA REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
35. See Steven M. Bellovin et al., Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping
on the Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 14–15 (2014).
36. See C. West Churchman, Wicked Problems, 14 MGMT. SCI. B141 (1967); Horst W.J. Rittel &
Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155 (1973).
37. Churchman, supra note 36, at B141.
38. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 36, at 160.
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and so on. This has all the hallmarks of a wicked problem. The goals are often
unclear and contested. Different groups may demand different things: homeowners
near the bridge may prioritize that it not block their view of the river; car and masstransit advocates may fight over whether the bridge should have dedicated bus
lanes; and environmentalists may be concerned with the bridge’s impact on the
river’s ecology and pollution levels. There’s no clear end-point to the problem, since
once the bridge is built, it will cause second-order effects on traffic, residential
patterns, and the environment that will have to be dealt with (and these secondorder effects will interact with each other, causing complicated interdependencies).
Because of the many and conflicting goals, there are no clear success criteria. And
because the context in which each bridge is built is unique, involving a different
constellation of interest groups and facts on the ground, it’s hard to apply lessons
learned from a “successful” bridge project in a context different from the current
one.
Wickedness is neither rare nor even particularly uncommon in today’s policy
landscape. Indeed, one could argue that any long-run policy problem that hasn’t yet
been solved is, at least among some dimensions, wicked.39 But the ubiquity of
wicked problems does not render the concept of wickedness superfluous; rather, it
underscores the importance, when confronting a policy problem, of clearly and
forthrightly recognizing those aspects that make it so difficult to solve. Thus, the
wicked-problem framework provides a sort of conceptual checklist by which
proposed solutions can be evaluated, and proposals—whether quick fixes or
comprehensive solutions—can be quickly weeded out if they overpromise or
otherwise ignore the inherent intractability of wicked problems.40 In other words, a
diagnosis of wickedness can bring about policy humility, which has two additional
useful consequences. It may lead us to take seriously proposals that might otherwise
be discarded as imperfect, second best, or non-ideal, so that the unobtainable
perfect does not crowd out the attainable good (or even middling).41 And this sense
of humility may lead parties on various sides of the issue to view each other’s
proposals and perspectives more charitably, and to better appreciate the value of
compromise.
B. Dimensions of Wickedness
The argument of this section is that the problem of government access to
encrypted data is a quintessential wicked problem. Here, I draw from various
theoretical discussions of wicked problems to identify their most salient features.

39.
a Research
40.
41.

See B. Guy Peters, What Is So Wicked About Wicked Problems? A Conceptual Analysis and
Program, 36 POL’Y & SOC’Y 385, 388 (2017).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
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1. There Is No Agreement on Goals
Conflicts over goals and values lie at the heart of many wicked problems. A
fundamental difficulty in solving the problem of law-enforcement access to data is
that there is no consensus as to what problem needs to be solved. Is the issue that
law enforcement is “going dark” in a way that threatens public safety, or is the issue
that law enforcement is enjoying a “golden age of surveillance” that threatens
privacy and civil liberties?42 As a result of this indeterminacy, traditional policy
analysis—such as attempts to require technology companies to internalize the social
costs of encryption—is similarly indeterminate.43
As fundamental as this problem uncertainty is, it’s only the most visible of a
number of framing conflicts. At the same time that the government wants access to
encrypted data, the companies that are making those devices are desperately trying
to protect them from hackers and criminals. Thus, what might appear from the
government’s perspective as an ecosystem whose cybersecurity is too robust (at least
when it comes to preventing lawful government access) is, from the perspective of
technology companies, a cat-and-mouse game between hackers and technology
companies that the companies are barely staying on top of. Indeed, this tension runs
so deep that the government can sometimes sound contradictory, as when officials
urge companies to build exceptional-access capabilities and widely deploy “strong
encryption” all at the same time. This does not mean that exceptional access systems
are, from an information-security perspective, worthless, but it does mean that the
two goals present difficult tradeoffs.
Part of the problem is that the very definition of the term “secure” (as in
“secure encryption” or “secure system”) depends on contested value judgments. In
the real world, security is never an all-or-nothing proposition. Security always comes
at a cost; for example, it takes more time and money to design more secure systems,
and security often requires trading off user features like password or data recovery.
The real question is whether a particular system is “secure enough.” This in turn
requires tallying up the benefits of the system to information security and
42. Compare James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks Before the Brookings
Institution: Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course? 2 (Oct. 16,
2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/10-16-14-Directors-Remarksfor-Brookings-Institution-AS-GIVEN.pdf [ https://perma.cc/6G5Y-5TWJ ] (“Unfortunately, the law
hasn’t kept pace with technology, and this disconnect has created a significant public safety problem.
We call it ‘Going Dark,’ and what it means is this: Those charged with protecting our people aren’t
always able to access the evidence we need to prosecute crime and prevent terrorism even with lawful
authority. We have the legal authority to intercept and access communications and information
pursuant to court order, but we often lack the technical ability to do so.”), with Swire & Ahmad, supra
note 3, at 420 (“Notably, law enforcement and national security agencies fear they are ‘going dark’ as
criminals and terrorists increasingly use a bewildering variety of new communications tools. On more
careful examination, however . . . this mix of new technology is actually enabling a ‘golden age of
surveillance.’”).
43. Cf. Claire A. Hill, The Rhetoric of Negative Externalities, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 517, 525
(2016).
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comparing those to the costs of that system to, for example, public safety in the
form of relevant data that is unavailable to law enforcement. This is not just an
empirical question; it is also a tradeoff between two security values: how much
(public-safety) security are we willing to give up for (information) security?44
Not only is cybersecurity a rival to public safety but so is business
competitiveness (a factor that encryption advocates are understandably reluctant to
emphasize publicly). Companies may resist demands by the government to provide
access to data because complying with such demands might be technologically
costly, or because it might cost companies business with civil liberties-minded users,
especially abroad.45
A final conflict is between the public safety of Americans versus the civil rights
of foreigners, particularly those living in repressive regimes. One argument
commonly raised against lawful access mandates is that their presence in the United
States will make it easier for other countries—particularly authoritarian ones—to
demand the same access. But unlike the United States, those countries may not use
this access in lawful or rights-respecting ways.46 As one technology-company
employee told me, “The government only has to worry about the safety of its
citizens. We don’t have that luxury. We have to worry about the safety of our users
everywhere, including from their own governments.”
2. Information Is Uncertain and Diffuse
A key challenge in solving wicked problems is that the information that is
necessary to solve them is usually unavailable, either because it is distributed among
numerous stakeholders, because it is hard to discover, or because it is fundamentally
unknowable. The problem of government access to encrypted data exhibits all these
informational difficulties.
First, we don’t know whether it is possible to build reasonably secure
encryption systems that provide exceptional access. Security researchers have
convincingly argued that building any such systems would require overcoming
several serious technical challenges—challenges to which there are no known
solutions.47 The question is how we ought to view the consensus
position: as a call for further research, or instead as a convincing-enough
demonstration of impossibility that settles the matter?
Several reasons suggest the former: the consensus position is best viewed as a
hypothesis that, while strong, should not yet be taken as conclusive. First, serious
researchers continue to work on the problem, and their work may yet lead to a
breakthrough.48 Second, widespread antipathy toward government in the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Rozenshtein, supra note 32, at 137.
See id. at 117–18.
See, e.g., Abelson et al., supra note 6, at 71.
See generally id.
See NASEM ENCRYPTION REPORT, supra note 8, at 46–47 (describing several
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technology industry and security-research community49 may be scaring away some
researchers from tackling the problem. For example, in his keynote speech at a
European information-security conference, Bart Preneel, a renowned Belgian
cryptographer whose research in encryption has made him both a hero to the
information-security and privacy communities and a thorn to law enforcement,
encouraged cryptographers to research secure exceptional-access systems (in
addition to generally improving the state of information security). After noting that
encryption “may sometimes damage what police do,” Preneel explained the need
for further research:
[I]t seems to be also a kind of a taboo to work on law-enforcement access,
and I think we should actually break this taboo. We should not say it’s
impossible. I think we should think about it at least. Write papers: how can
we do this better? . . . [I] don’t think it should be a forbidden question to
think about. Imagine we had perfect channels, perfectly secure devices—
there [are] some cases where government may need access. How would we
do this? In an auditable way, in a controllable way, in a limited way. We
have actually no answers either.50
The dangers of groupthink in retarding scientific research by disfavoring
certain research agendas is well-known51 and reflects a more general facet of
motivated cognition. As Claire Hill has observed, “[I]t is difficult to get a person to
understand something when her (individual and[,] more importantly, social) identity
depends on her not understanding it.”52 The presence of groupthink and taboorecent proposals); see also Steven Levy, Cracking the Crypto War, WIRED (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/crypto-war-clear-encryption/ [ https://perma.cc/X5MC-LEQV ]
(describing one of these proposals in greater depth). Many proposals are variations on the “key escrow”
model made (in)famous by the failed Clipper Chip, and, as such, they have been criticized on similar
grounds. See, e.g., Matthew Green, A Few Thoughts on Ray Ozzie’s “Clear” Proposal, A FEW THOUGHTS
ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING (Apr. 26, 2018), https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/
2018/04/26/a-few-thoughts-on-ray-ozzies-clear-proposal/ [ https://perma.cc/MU38-LD45 ]; see also
STEFAN SAVAGE, LAWFUL DEVICE ACCESS WITHOUT MASS SURVEILLANCE RISK: A TECHNICAL
DESIGN DISCUSSION (2018). Other proposals do not rely on key escrow. See, e.g., CHARLES V. WRIGHT
& MAYANK VARIA, CRYPTO CRUMPLE ZONES: ENABLING LIMITED ACCESS WITHOUT MASS
SURVEILLANCE (2018), https://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~cvwright/papers/crumplezones.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/3Q7G-E4DH ].
49. Rozenshtein, supra note 32, at 118–19.
50. Bart Preneel, The Future of Cryptography, EUROCRYPT ( June 5, 2016), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=GWXIxBd3m0Y [ https://perma.cc/5SK9-MCZV ] at 56:58–57:34; see
also Kieran McCarthy, Crypto-Gurus: Which Idiots Told the FBI That Feds-only Backdoors in Encryption
Are Possible?, REGISTER (Feb. 14, 2018, 8:06 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/02/14/
cryptography_experts_fbi/ [ https://perma.cc/NB3Y-RDYE ] (“The FBI is also unlikely to release the
names of those it has been consulting over fears that they would be ridiculed and come under pressure
from their peers not to work on such an approach.”).
51. The recognition that scientific research can be shaped by psychological, sociological, and
other non-scientific considerations is at the heart of modern sociological studies of science. See generally
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (4th ed. 2012).
52. Claire A. Hill, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate, 41 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 475, 482 (2018).
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driven reasoning does not by itself undermine the current consensus that secure
exceptional access is impossible. But it does suggest that more research is in order.
A second informational difficulty with the problem of access to encrypted
data is that it exhibits many complex interdependencies and second-order effects.
The obvious examples are technological. On the one hand, exceptional access may
create systemic, hard-to-predict security risks that harm overall information security.
On the other hand, a regime of widespread lawful hacking (the only plausible
alternative to third-party access) could have its own negative effects on information
security.53
Second-order effects go beyond technical issues. On the legal front, the
increasing prevalence of encryption could lead courts to restrict Fourth Amendment
rights in a variety of ways. For example, they could expand the exigent
circumstances doctrine to allow police to warrantlessly search unlocked cell phones
that are recovered incident to arrest if the police credibly believe the phones are
about to auto-lock or become otherwise inaccessible.54 And if metadata becomes
comparatively more important to law-enforcement investigations55—since
metadata, unlike content, is likely to remain unencrypted56—courts may think twice
about further limiting the reach of the third-party doctrine.57
A third problem is that the encryption issue has several distinct sub-issues,
each with its own unique challenges. The problem of “data in motion” (data that is
encrypted as it travels across the Internet) is distinct from the problem of “data at
rest” (data that is encrypted when it is stored). Data-at-rest problems can be further
subdivided: Is the data stored on the user’s device or in the cloud? Would
exceptional access only apply to a company’s own products or would it require the
company to block non-complying third-party application; for example, would it be
enough for Apple to provide exceptional access for iOS devices and its iMessage
service, or would it also have to prohibit third-party secure-messaging apps like
Telegram or Signal? Would the exceptional-access procedure require that the
government have physical access to the device or would it permit remote access
(which would increase the risk of unauthorized access)?
53. See infra Part III.B.
54. See Rozenshtein, supra note 32, at 169–70. In the summer of 2018, Apple released a software
update that would make it impossible for third parties, including law enforcement, to access a locked
iOS device’s data and charging port an hour after the device is locked. Jack Nicas, Apple to Close iPhone
Security Hole That Law Enforcement Uses to Crack Devices, N.Y. TIMES ( June 13, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/technology/apple-iphone-police.html [https://perma.cc/
VT53-D6LP]; see also Riana Pfefferkorn, Exigent Circumstances: iOS 12’s USB Restricted Mode and
Warrantless iPhone Access, JUST SECURITY ( June 22, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58345/exigentcircumstances-ios-12s-usb-restricted-mode-warrantless-iphone-access [ https://perma.cc/NZB5YTNP ].
55. Pell, supra note 4, at 619–20.
56. DON’T PANIC, supra note 7, at 3.
57. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). See generally Alan Z. Rozenshtein,
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE L.J.F. 943 (2019).
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A fourth issue is that there is no way to test whether a particular exceptionalaccess solution works—whether from a technological, legal, or policy perspective—
except to try it. But attempts to solve wicked problems are not free—they leave
“‘traces’ that cannot be undone.”58 Because decision-makers are not free to
experiment, the decisions they ultimately make will be hampered by suboptimal
information. This makes it that much more important to do as much preimplementation analysis, and to collect as much information from as broad an array
of sources, as is possible.
A fifth informational difficulty is that the past can only offer limited lessons.59
It is tempting to think of the current debate as a repeat of the crypto wars of the
1990s. But some commentators have gone further, arguing that the issue of
government access to encrypted data was definitively resolved with the failure of
the Clipper Chip, government-designed hardware that would be incorporated into
consumer devices and that would simultaneously provide encryption and
exceptional access.60 For example, Steven Levy, author of the leading history of the
crypto wars,61 has asked, “Why are we fighting the crypto wars again?” and has
complained that the U.S. government is “welching on [the] deal” that resolved the
first crypto wars—that cryptography would be left largely unregulated.62
But stare decisis doesn’t apply to public policy, especially when the
technological, policy, and legal debates at issue are over twenty years old. First,
there’s no guarantee that the issue of government access to encrypted devices was
properly decided in the 1990s. Although specific flaws were indeed discovered in
the Clipper Chip’s design, those flaws were not in the level of protection afforded
to the user (the sort of flaw that would be of greatest concern in a mandatory-access
regime); rather, the flaws could allow individuals to bypass the key escrow process,
thereby rendering their communications confidential as against the government.63
It is possible that additional research could have solved these problems.
Second, and more importantly, even if the first crypto war was properly
resolved (for example, because the sort of key-escrow system the government
proposed was simply too vulnerable64), that doesn’t mean that the current policy
dispute should be precluded by the previous one. Too many variables are different

58.
59.
60.
61.

Rittel & Webber, supra note 36, at 163.
Id. at 164–65.
See Froomkin, supra note 2, at 752–79.
See STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT—
SAVING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2001).
62. Steven Levy, Why Are We Fighting the Crypto Wars Again?, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2016, 12:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/why-are-we-fighting-the-crypto-wars-again [ https://
perma.cc/5ZHQ-N9FA ].
63. See Matt Blaze, Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard, 2 PROC. ACM
CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 59 (1994).
64. See Hal Abelson et al., The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party
Encryption, 2 WORLD WIDE WEB J. 241 (1997).
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today than they were twenty years ago. From the government’s perspective,
encryption has spread enormously in the past twenty years, from a few niche
applications to being omnipresent, especially on consumer devices like phones,
tablets, and computers. Thus, why shouldn’t the U.S. government “welch” on a
“deal” that really amounted to a temporary truce, especially if the cost-benefit
analysis may have changed? As Levy himself admits, the reason crypto wars have
restarted is because “[f]or the first time, [the government is] really struggling with
the results of the first war, as more information is now encrypted, increasingly in a
manner the government finds really hard (or impossible) to decode.”65
Alternatively, from the perspective of industry and information-security
advocates, the very spread of encryption means that any risk that a governmentaccess mandate could be compromised makes it that much more important to resist
them. For both sides, then, the current environment is sufficiently different as to
render any “lessons” from the first crypto wars at best provisional.
3. The Problem Cannot Be Fully or Permanently Solved
There can and will be no permanent resolution to the problem of lawenforcement access to encrypted data, for several reasons. First, as just mentioned,
the resolution of a particular problem is always contingent and up for renegotiation,
since the underlying parameters of the negotiation—for example, the technological
realities and the costs and benefits to various social values like privacy and
security—can change over time. Again, it’s a fallacy to ascribe precedential force to
a public-policy status quo.
Second, the nature of the problem keeps changing as technology advances. In
the 1990s, law enforcement’s chief concern was encryption. In the interbellum
period of the 2000s—after the first crypto war ended and before the second broke
out—law enforcement’s focus switched to ensuring that voice-over-IP (VoIP)
telephone and other communications providers maintained intercept capabilities.66
Today, encryption is back in the spotlight, but it is far from the only part of the
“going dark” problem. Equally important is law-enforcement access to data stored
by U.S. companies outside the United States.67 No doubt the future will subject
lawful surveillance to technical impediments as yet unimagined.
Third, any solution to the problem of government access to encrypted data
will involve costly tradeoffs. On the one hand, any solution will likely decrease, at

65. Levy, supra note 62.
66. See Am. Council on Educ. v. F.C.C., 451 F.3d 226, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding the
FCC’s classification of broadband and VoIP providers as “telecommunications carriers” under
CALEA); Valerie Caproni, Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security (Feb. 17, 2011), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/
testimony/going-dark-lawful-electronic-surveillance-in-the-face-of-new-technologies [ https://
perma.cc/TT77-8BAJ ].
67. See Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2018).
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least marginally (and perhaps substantially more), the overall security of encrypted
systems. Security researchers will thus—as they should—constantly advocate for
changes to the system so as to minimize those risks.
On the other hand, no solution will fully prevent criminals from using
encryption that law enforcement cannot defeat, because there are hundreds of
encrypted hardware and software services, both in the United States and abroad,
that an individual seeking encrypted communications or storage could use.68 Even
the most extreme government-access proposals would not be able to reach every
encrypted product in the United States, not to mention foreign products. This does
not mean that attempts to regulate encryption are fruitless. The vast majority of
criminals are unsophisticated and will stick to the most popular consumer products
(which could be more easily regulated).69 And the resources freed up by easier access
to those criminals’ data could be used on the expensive, one-off techniques—such
as lawful hacking70—necessary to access the encrypted data of more sophisticated
criminals. But law enforcement will still frequently be stymied in its quest for data
and so will continuously push for farther-reaching regulation of encryption.
As the political scientist Charles E. Lindblom explained in a seminal article on
public administration: “Policy is not made once and for all; it is made and re-made
endlessly. Policy-making is a process of successive approximation to some desired
objectives in which what is desired itself continues to change under
reconsideration.”71 The problem of law-enforcement access to encrypted data
typifies this chronic aspect of the most difficult policy problems.
********************************************************************
The above discussion may strike some as discouraging, but it need not.
Recognizing that something is a wicked problem is not an admission of its
insolubility; rather, it’s just a realistic appreciation of its challenges. Progress on
difficult social problems reflects, almost by definition, progress on wicked
problems, whether economic inequality, environmental degradation, or government
access to data. Progress can be made, but it first requires a clear-eyed appreciation
of the nature of the problem and the nature of its challenges.
III. LESSONS
A. Beware Easy Answers
If nothing else, recognizing that law-enforcement access to encrypted data is
a wicked problem should make us skeptical of proposals that attempt to fully solve
(or dissolve) the problem. A particularly common mistake in this regard is to
68. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, KATHLEEN SEIDEL & SARANYA VITAYAKUMAR, A WORLDWIDE
SURVEY OF ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS 2 (2016), https://www.schneier.com/cryptography/
paperfiles/worldwide-survey-of-encryption-products.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7EV-N2QN].
69. See Bellovin et al., supra note 35.
70. See infra Part III.B.
71. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”, 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79, 86 (1959).
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propose a solution that either ignores or denies the existence of the complexities
and tradeoffs that categorize wicked problems. This section gives two such
examples—one advanced by the government, the other by its critics—and
illustrates how the theory of wicked problems can vividly highlight each argument’s
flaws.
1. Exceptional-Access Mandates
As noted above, the decision to design an encrypted system that doesn’t
permit exceptional access is not preordained. Rather, it is a design choice that each
provider makes depending on its values and business interests, as well as what it
believes its users demand. For this reason, when the government is faced with an
encrypted system that it cannot access, even with a warrant or other judicial process,
it can try to demand that the provider redesign its system or take some other action
to help the government access the needed data. Collectively, we can call all such
requests exceptional-access mandates.
The problem is that systems that permit exceptional access are generally less
secure than systems that don’t. There are several reasons for this. First, the more
entities there are that can decrypt data, the more opportunities there are for a bad
actor to access that data, including by hacking or getting help from insiders. Second,
a system that allows for exceptional access is more complicated than a system
without such access and thus “run[s] afoul of the information security axiom that
‘complexity is the enemy of security.’”72 This is especially true for systems that give
law enforcement access, since they would have to cater to many different lawenforcement entities, both in the United States and around the world. A system that
gave the FBI access might not work the same way for the tens of thousands of state
and local law-enforcement agencies. And it would be even harder to design a system
that would simultaneously give United States and French (let alone Russian or
Chinese) law-enforcement officials access without opening one country’s citizens
up to the risk of surveillance by another country’s government.73
For various reasons, the government has so far declined to offer any proposals
for how a law-enforcement exceptional-access system would actually work.74
72. See Rozenshtein, supra note 32, at 138 (2018) (citing Ronald L. Rivest, On the Notion of
“Software Independence” in Voting Systems, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 3759, 3760
(2008) (“It is a common maxim that complexity is the enemy of security and accuracy, thus it is very
difficult to evaluate a complex system.”)).
73. See Abelson, supra note 6, at 18.
74. Reasons include that the government recognizes that industry has greater technical expertise
than the government does (at least outside the foreign-intelligence context), performance standards are
generally more popular than are design mandates in contemporary regulatory practice, and the
government was badly burned when, in the 1990s, its Clipper Chip proposal was found to be technically
flawed. See Sean Gallagher, What the Government Should’ve Learned About Backdoors from the Clipper
Chip, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 14, 2015, 3:05 PM), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2015/12/what-the-government-shouldve-learned-about-backdoors-from-the-clipper-chip
[ https://perma.cc/Q6X5-CQT5 ].
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Instead, government officials insist that the problem—designing a lawful-access
system that is scalable and secure—is solvable and that, with their impressive record
of technological innovation, Silicon Valley’s engineers simply need to try harder.
For example, as FBI Director Wray has argued:
We have the brightest minds doing and creating fantastic things. If we can
develop driverless cars . . . if we can establish entire computer-generated
virtual worlds . . . surely we should be able to design devices that both
provide data security and permit lawful access with a court order.75
Scholars supporting the government’s position have similarly insisted that
technology companies solve the technical challenges inherent in third-party
solutions, without explaining beyond bare outlines how companies are to go about
doing so.76 But the difficulty in building third-party access is not in the high-level
approaches to “splitting keys” or putting keys in “escrow,” but instead in the actual
implementations that have to be used in the field and at scale. If there is to be a
“Manhattan-like project” to create secure exceptional-access systems (as Hillary
Clinton called for during the 2016 campaign),77 it will have to focus on these tricky
implementation issues.
Ultimately there’s no guarantee that scalable and secure exceptional access is
possible. It’s no use arguing that, because Silicon Valley has done a bunch of
amazing things, it should just “nerd harder” to do this other amazing thing;78 the
problems are fundamentally different. As critics of the government’s position have
acidly noted, the government’s argument is akin to telling NASA, “Well, if we can
put a man on the moon, well, surely we can put a man on the sun.”79
Of course, that the problem is difficult doesn’t mean (unlike landing on the
sun) that it’s impossible. The point is that any solution will require a massive amount

75. Christopher Wray, Remarks at the Fordham University - FBI International Conference on
Cyber Security ( Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/raising-our-game-cyber-securityin-an-age-of-digital-transformation [ https://perma.cc/HEG6-GXL8 ].
76. See, e.g., Averting the Inherent Dangers, supra note 4, at 1445 (describing, at a high level of
generality, a “‘split key’ approach” by which manufacturers would create keys that could access
encrypted devices and that the “keys would be ‘split’ and retained by two (or more) distinct entities: the
manufacturer and a privacy rights organization”); Jaffer & Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 310–11 (similarly
advocating for a “splitting keys” approach); Opderbeck, supra note 4, at 737 (“For encrypted data at
rest, a reasonable approach could include a requirement that the service provider render technological
assistance in retrieving plaintext pursuant to a valid court order. This could be accomplished by the
provider through the use of public key encryption with a key escrow retained by the provider, or by any
other reasonable means.”).
77. See Keith Wagstaff, Could Hillary Clinton’s Encryption “Manhattan Project” Work?, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015, 12:21 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/could-hillary-clinton-sencryption-manhattan-project-work-n484086 [ https://perma.cc/D79X-6YYA ].
78. See Julian Sanchez (@normative), TWITTER ( Jan. 29, 2016, 7:34 AM),
https://twitter.com/normative/status/693049694457569281 [https://perma.cc/5UBX-U7BY] (“We
all know their answer, right? Some variant on: Nerd harder! Love will find a way!”).
79. See Matt Blaze, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, YOUTUBE (March 13, 2016), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsjZ2r9Ygzw [ https://perma.cc/B8MF-6TP3 ].
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of research and development to which the government has so far not publicly
contributed. Until the government develops the institutions that will incentivize and
help Silicon Valley and the broader information-security community tackle this
monumental technical challenge, its demands for exceptional access will remain the
first step, not the last, to solving this problem.
2. “Going Dark” vs. “A Golden Age of Surveillance”
The government’s argument that it is “going dark”—in the face of encryption
and other technical impediments to surveillance—has not gone unchallenged. Peter
Swire and Kenesa Ahmad have argued that, far from going dark, the government is
enjoying “a golden age of surveillance.”80 Conceding that encryption may hamper
government access to data in some circumstances, Swire and Ahmad argue that the
net effect of new technology is to greatly facilitate government surveillance. They
cite the many technologies that have in a few short decades created massive new
troves of data for the government to access, from cell-phone location-tracking data
to the masses of information held as emails, messages, and social-media logs.81 In
the years since Swire and Ahmad made their “golden age” argument, potential
sources of surveillance data have only increased. The “Internet of Things” will
create even more targets for government surveillance,82 as has already occurred with
always-on, always-listening “smart speakers” like the Amazon Echo.83 And as virtual
and augmented reality become more prominent, they will generate huge collections
of data that may be useful to government investigators.84 And no matter the source,
a large proportion of data will always remain unencrypted, either because encryption
would be technologically infeasible (as with the case of the metadata that routes
internet traffic) or because the technology companies that hold that data would find
it in their business interests to maintain access to that data (for example, to more
effectively sell advertisements).85
80. Swire & Ahmad, supra note 3, at 463.
81. Id. at 466–70.
82. DON’T PANIC, supra note 7, at 12–15; Pell, supra note 4.
83. See Amy B. Wang, Can Amazon Echo Help Solve a Murder? Police Will Soon Find Out.,
WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/
09/can-amazon-echo-help-solve-a-murder-police-will-soon-find-out/ [ https://perma.cc/8QVH-LN
AS ]; see also Sarah Knapton, Fridges and Washington Mahines Could Be Vital Witnesses in Murder Plots,
TELEGRAPH ( Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/01/02/fridges-washingmachines-could-vital-witnesses-murder-plots [ https://perma.cc/4BRS-M9DM ] (quoting a London
police official who argued that “[w]ireless cameras within a device such as [the] fridge may record the
movement of owners and suspects,” that “[d]oorbells that connect directly to apps on a user’s phone
can show who has rung the door and the owner or others may then remotely, if they choose, to give
controlled access to the premises while away from the property,” and that “[a]ll these [activities] leave
a log and a trace of activity”).
84. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (2018); Gilad Yadin, Virtual Reality Surveillance, 35 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 707 (2017).
85. DON’T PANIC, supra note 7, at 3.
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The “golden age” argument has drawn sharp critiques from the government.
For example, law enforcement has argued that metadata will never replace the
investigative or evidentiary value of actual content; metadata may be enough to
place a suspect at the scene of the crime, but it’s not enough to establish that the
person actually pulled the trigger.86 Law enforcement can also point to increased
juror expectations for digital evidence: the “tech effect” by which jurors
“significantly expect that prosecutors will use the advantages of modern science and
technology to help meet their burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”87
The concern is that, as jurors come to recognize how much data is (theoretically)
available to law enforcement, they will view prosecutorial cases more skeptically if
they’re not presented with all that data. This is a particular problem for state and
local police departments, which may not have access to the same sophisticated
techniques yet will be held to the same high standards by local jurors. For example,
a study of jurors in a Michigan county found that nearly half “believe[d] the police
should use DNA analysis in every case.”88 It’s easy to imagine similar attitudes with
respect to digital forensics.
But let’s assume that the empirical premise of the golden-age argument is
correct, and that the government has, on net, greater surveillance capabilities, and
thus crime-fighting power, today than it did before the digital age, even taking
encryption into account. What does that actually mean for the larger debate over
whether the government should be able to access encrypted (or otherwise
technologically inaccessible) data? The short answer is: very little. Indeed, whether
the government is “going dark” or instead is enjoying a “golden age of surveillance”
is, despite its centrality in both academic and popular discussion of the issue, largely
orthogonal to the issues at stake.
Debates about whether the government is “going dark” or instead is enjoying
a “golden age of surveillance” are, in the first instance, competing descriptive
accounts over how much surveillance power the government currently enjoys. But
the reason we spend so much time on this question is because it serves as a proxy
for the fight people actually care about: whether the government, as a normative
matter, has too much or not enough access to data. The reason for the proxy is that
this normative question is hard to answer. In order to tally up the costs and benefits

86. See NASEM ENCRYPTION REPORT, supra note 8, at 44 (noting that “information is not
fungible” and that the “law enforcement community thus argues that it is much harder to convince a
jury of criminal intent using metadata evidence than with content evidence”). The intelligence
community has similarly stressed the importance of metadata. See Letter from the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Ron Wyden 2 (May 5, 2016), available at
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ODNI%20Legal%20Review%20of%20Dont%20P
anic%20Article.pdf [ https://perma.cc/AM8J-35ZK ].
87. Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific
Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 364 (2006).
88. Donald E. Shelton et al., An Indirect-Effects Model of Mediated Adjudication: The CSI Myth,
the Tech Effect, and Metropolitan Jurors’ Expectations for Scientific Evidence, 12 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 1, 28–29 (2009).

Final to Printer_Rozenshtein (Do Not Delete)

1202

U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW

8/12/2019 2:23 PM

[Vol. 9:1181

of government surveillance, one would have to answer a number of difficult
questions: To what extent does any particular technical impediment to government
surveillance—encryption, offshoring, and so on—impede government
investigations? When a government investigation is thwarted, how much does that
harm society? And, conversely, what are the harms to society from increased
government surveillance?
A common way to avoid these difficult questions is to rely on heuristics—
rules of thumb—that simplify the analysis. An approach frequently used by even
sophisticated commentators on both sides of the “going dark” debate is the status
quo heuristic. This heuristic first picks some historical baseline of law-enforcement
surveillance capabilities (or the mirror image, law-enforcement infringements on
privacy) and criticizes the current state of affairs as diverging from that baseline.
Both the government and its critics have operated from the status-quo baseline,
though from opposite directions. For the government, the relevant baseline is recent
history—specifically, right before companies like Apple and WhatsApp encrypted
their products. From this baseline, the government’s ability to surveil has
diminished. For critics of government surveillance, the relevant baseline is the predigital age, before smartphones and social media vastly expanded the government’s
surveillance capabilities. From this baseline, the technological changes underlying
the “going dark” problem are mere blips on the otherwise rocketing growth of the
surveillance state.
But baseline arguments like these have two serious flaws. The first is the
problem, which afflicts baseline arguments generally, that there may be no nonarbitrary way of picking the “right” baseline.89 Yet the choice of baseline is crucial,
often determining the outcome of the analysis. Here, the critical choice is between
a pre-encryption baseline and a pre-digital-age baseline, and there’s no reason why
one is less of a legitimate status quo than is the other.
The second and more serious problem is that, even if one could non-arbitrarily
pick a government-surveillance baseline, it’s not clear why sticking to it would be
normatively desirable. Just calling something a baseline doesn’t by itself provide a
reason to abide by it. One needs some other reason. Frequently this other reason is
legal: for example, if the Fourth Amendment prohibits general warrants, or if the
Wiretap Act imposes “super-warrant” requirements for wiretaps, the rule of law
provides a normative reason to not deviate from the legal baseline—that is, what
the law says. But policy baselines lack this sort of independent normative force; by
assumption, the government has the legal ability to engage in some sort of
surveillance, and the question is whether or not that surveillance is normatively
desirable on the basis of social welfare.
Defenders of the status quo sometimes appeal to “balance,” as in the balance
between security and public safety on the one side and privacy and civil liberties on
the other. The problem with the balance argument is that it is unsupportable and so
89.

See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 14.
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frequently begs the question. If by “balance” defenders of the status quo simply
mean the state of affairs they want to preserve, then appeals to balance are circular:
“we should stick to the status quo because it represents a balance between security
and privacy” ends up meaning “we should stick to the status quo because it’s the
status quo.” Alternatively, if balance is given some additional content, the arguments
for why it has that content and why that content should matter are typically begged.
For example, the word “balance” is often used to evoke stability. But this stability
is more often assumed than demonstrated. The government’s surveillance
capabilities are always in flux and the stability that attends the description of those
capabilities at a particular moment is often the result of taking a snapshot of a
dynamic, rather than static, system.
More fundamentally, even if the current state of affairs represents some
ongoing equilibrium, this fact only weakly supports the claim that the status quo is
optimal or even just better than the alternative that is being argued against. At most
it (weakly) suggests that, in light of the background conditions in effect at the time—
the government’s technological capabilities, the societal values placed on security
and privacy, and so on—the status quo represented a local maximum (and even this
requires the contestable assumption that social policy gets better over time). But
change those conditions and all bets are off. For example, a critic of DNA testing
could not convincingly argue that, simply because there was no DNA testing before
the technology had been developed, the long-run “balance” should continue into
the post-DNA-testing age.
Nor are the only background changes technological. Background changes in
social values can also render the status quo inappropriate. Consider a situation in
which society has to make a tradeoff between security and privacy. The optimal
tradeoff will depend on the relative value society ascribes to these goods, and these
values may change over time. The psychologist Steven Pinker has described how
western society, including in the United States, has experienced “a rising abhorrence
of violence, and of even the slightest trace of a mindset that might lead to it.”90 This
has led to an increasing categorization of many once-common practices as morally
reprehensible, from the overdue (sexual harassment and assault) to the silly
(schoolyard dodgeball91). The more intolerant society becomes to violence and
crime, and the more it categorizes certain activities that were once merely frowned
upon as legitimate targets for state intervention (domestic violence is perhaps the
most striking example over the past fifty years), the more society will demand

90. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED 388 (2011).
91. See, e.g., Increasingly, Schools Move to Restrict Dodgeball, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/06/us/increasingly-schools-move-to-restrict-dodgeball.html
[ https://perma.cc/ZZ2G-L7K8 ] (quoting a “curriculum specialist” who argues against dodgeball on
the grounds that, “[w]ith Columbine and all the violence that we are having, we have to be very careful
with how we teach our children”).
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increased security, even at the cost of privacy and other competing values. And once
the government moves to satisfy these increased public safety expectations, the
increased size and expense of the public-safety bureaucracy in turn drive greater
public expectations of public safety, leading to a feedback loop of growing
expectations.92
By the same token, changes in attitudes toward privacy could also require a
recalibration in one direction or the other. Perhaps Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg was right when, in 2010, he questioned whether privacy was still a
relevant “social norm.”93 Echoing this observation, Bernard Harcourt has
powerfully written how we are often the greatest threat to our own privacy, as we
“give ourselves up in a mad frenzy of disclosure.”94 Changed norms may explain
why Congress reauthorized, even in a post-Snowden environment, a far-reaching
national-security surveillance program that warrantlessly collects information (albeit
incidentally) on potentially millions of Americans. On the other hand, perhaps we
are due for a correction in the direction of less surveillance and more privacy,
especially in the wake of Russian interference in the 2016 election and increasing
concerns that too much of our data is available for manipulation.
Nothing I’ve said should be interpreted as an argument against incrementalism,
the position that policy change should happen gradually, especially under conditions
of complexity, disagreement over goals, and incomplete information.95
Incrementalism can even justify a decision strategy that gives some of the same
results as one dependent on the status quo fallacy. Imagine that law enforcement
has a surveillance capacity s, that it has had this capacity for some time, and that this
capacity is generally regarded as acceptable (even if suboptimal) from an overall
social-welfare perspective. Now imagine some exogenous shock—for example,
technological and social change—that dramatically and rapidly increases the amount
of data individuals produce and that enhances law enforcement surveillance
capabilities such that the new s’ is far greater than s.
The problem confronting society is to decide whether society is better off at
s’ versus s. Incrementalism tells us the status quo is the best source of information
for evaluating alternatives.96 But if the alternative is radically different than the status
92. See FRANK P. HARVEY, THE HOMELAND SECURITY DILEMMA 1, 16–17 (2008).
93. Bobbie Johnson, Privacy Is No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, GUARDIAN
( Jan. 10, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy [ https://
perma.cc/L3A3-GEZL ].
94. BERNARD HARCOURT, EXPOSED 18 (2015).
95. For classic statements of incrementalism and its benefits, see, for example, JAMES C. SCOTT,
SEEING LIKE A STATE 345 (1998); ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS,
ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE 82–85 (1953); Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39
PUB. AD. REV. 517 (1979); Lindblom, supra note 71, at 84–88, 88 n.9 (1959). For applications of
incrementalism in the legal literature, see, for example, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME
(1999); Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981);
Ozan O. Varol, Temporary Constitutions, 102 CAL. L. REV. 409, 421–27 (2014).
96. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 535–37 (2011).
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quo, this comparison may not be available. Thus, from a decision-strategy
standpoint, incrementalism may counsel for a correction, by which society brings s’
back to s (or close to) and then applies incremental analysis to see if a move toward
the full s’ is justified on welfarist grounds. But note the role of the status quo in this
analysis; there’s no assumption that it’s superior or encodes a beneficial “balance.”
Rather, the status quo is simply the best source of information we have and so any
deviations from it should be gradual, not disruptive.
If the status-quo heuristic won’t work as a guide for policymaking, what should
take its place? The problem with the status-quo approach is that it’s an insufficient
proxy for what we actually care about: not whether the government has more or
less surveillance powers than it did in the past, but rather whether the government,
right now, has too much or too little such powers. As difficult as this inquiry might
be, there is no substitute for a substantive inquiry into the optimal level of
government surveillance.
One way to answer the question is to adopt a precautionary approach: pick
some value and reject any policies that harm that value, no matter how marginally.
In the context of government surveillance, Cass Sunstein has identified two
applications of this approach: “Cheneyism” and “Snowdenism”. Cheneyism focuses
on security threats and argues that almost any policy is justified if it lowers the risk
of those security threats. Snowdenism, by contrast, focuses on the threats of
government surveillance and argues that no surveillance should be conducted if it
even marginally increases the risk of government surveillance abuses.97 Although
Cheneyism and Snowdenism are theoretical positions—in practice, no one
(probably not even Dick Cheney nor Edward Snowden themselves) actually
subscribe to them in their strongest forms—they are useful labels because they
identify the two main poles of precautionary thinking about government
surveillance.
There are two problems with positions like Cheneyism and Snowdenism. First,
they are not just based on different empirical judgments about the world—for
example, judgments about the likelihood of terrorist attacks or of government
surveillance abuses—but also about different values. Cheneyists might simply value
physical safety more than do Snowdenists, and vice versa for privacy. It’s not clear
whether there are any “neutral principles” available for choosing between such
incommensurable values.
Second, Cheneyism and Snowdenism, like all applications of the precautionary
principle, ignore the fact that optimizing for one value might impose large costs on
competing values. It’s not like Cheneyists don’t care at all about preventing
government abuse or Snowdenists completely discount the role government
surveillance plays in ensuring public safety and national security. The problem with

97.

Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Cheneyism and Snowdenism, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 271–73 (2016).
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each approach is that, by focusing on a single value, each uses excessively “narrow
viewscreens, focusing on a subset of the risks at stake rather than the whole.”98
Instead of Cheneyism or Snowdenism, what is required is risk
management: recognizing that “risks of many kinds are on both sides of the ledger,
and the task is to manage the full set, not to focus on one or a few.”99 As Sunstein
recognizes, however, traditional risk management—in the form of some sort of
cost-benefit analysis—is difficult to deploy where the costs and benefits of the
policy are difficult to quantify, either because they are uncertain or because they
require monetizing seemingly unmonetizable values (how do you put a price on
privacy or a human life?).100
These are indeed difficult challenges, but, as the rest of the Article argues, we
can make progress on them. We have no choice.
B. Focus on Imperfect Solutions: The Case of Lawful Hacking
Although wicked problems cannot be solved, they can be managed. But to do
so, we must focus our attention on imperfect solutions, while at the same time being
sensitive to their drawbacks.
The most important such proposal, advocated for by an increasing proportion
of the information-security community, is for the government to expand its “lawful
hacking” of devices.101 As is apparent to anyone whose computer has ever been
infected by a virus or whose smartphone incessantly pesters about “critical security”
system updates, electronic devices are shot through with software vulnerabilities.
These vulnerabilities allow unauthorized third parties,102 whether criminal hackers
or government investigators, to overcome whatever security measures are in place
and access user data. Lawful hacking proposals differ in their details; some
envision the government purchasing hacking tools from third parties (as the
FBI did when it accessed the iPhone of one of the San Bernardino terrorists),103
98. Id. at 277.
99. Id. at 283.
100. Id. at 284–85.
101. The most comprehensive proposal for lawful hacking is Bellovin et al., supra note 35; see
also Susan Hennessey, Lawful Hacking and the Case for a Strategic Approach to Going Dark, in
BROOKINGS BIG IDEAS FOR AMERICA 241 (Michael E. O’Hanlon ed., 2017); Kerr & Schneier, supra
note 4, at 1009–12. For a more critical perspective, especially in the context of extra-territorial searches,
see Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the Dark Web, 69
STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1095–99 (2017).
102. Frequently, the term “attacker” is used to describe any third party who accesses a device
or system without authorization. I avoid that term here because I don’t want to want to imply that
unauthorized access is ipso facto normatively problematic. Thus, the FBI investigator who exploits a
vulnerability on a criminal’s phone is an “attacker” from the perspective of the criminal’s interest in
information security, though the FBI agent may be doing precisely what we want them to do.
103. More recently, a company called Grayshift developed “GrayKey,” hardware which
purportedly can unlock all versions of iPhones. See Annie Palmer, The $15,000 Device That Can Unlock
ANY iPhone: US Police Forces Buying “GrayKey” Box to Crack into Encrypted Phones—but
Experts Warn It Could Be Exploited by Hackers, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 17, 2018, 11:32 EDT),
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while others would have the government invest in in-house computer hacking
expertise104 (essentially an FBI-housed domestic analogue to the NSA’s
Tailored Access Operations team, which is responsible for breaking into foreign
computer systems105).
The biggest argument in favor of lawful hacking is that it takes advantage of
pre-existing vulnerabilities in computer and communications systems. Unlike
exceptional-access mandates, lawful hacking does not require providers to make
changes to their systems that might introduce even more security flaws. Thus, lawful
hacking can, at least at a first approximation, improve law enforcement’s capabilities
without further degrading the public’s already precarious information security.
At the same time, lawful hacking has a number of limitations, many of which
flow from the wicked nature of the problem of government access to encrypted
data.
First, and as its proponents recognize, lawful hacking will only be a partial
solution, especially outside the context of high-value national security or foreign
intelligence operations. There is no guarantee that a particular device or application
has a vulnerability that would allow access. Even if such a vulnerability exists, the
government may not be able to discover it. And even if the government knows that
a third party has knowledge of a suitable vulnerability (or, better yet, a ready-made
tool that would allow government access), the vulnerability may be too expensive
for the government to acquire, especially if different investigative targets require
different vulnerabilities or the targets upgrade their systems, rendering existing
vulnerabilities no longer effective.106 Moreover, the vulnerability may be so sensitive
that the government would only be willing to use it for its highest-value targets,107
especially if it would have to disclose the technical details of the vulnerability in a
follow-on prosecution.108

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5613597/Police-claim-unlock-iPhone-usingmysterious-10-000-GrayKey-box.html [ https://perma.cc/33G7-5SP9 ].
104. See, e.g., Susan Landau, What Law Enforcement Really Needs for Investigations in the Digital
Age, LAWFARE (Feb. 12, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-law-enforcementreally-needs-investigations-digital-age [ https://perma.cc/43C6-SKUU ].
105. See Kim Zetter, NSA Hacker Chief Explains How to Keep Him out of Your System, WIRED
( Jan. 28, 2016, 9:23 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/nsa-hacker-chief-explains-how-to-keephim-out-of-your-system [ https://perma.cc/TJ7U-SR94 ].
106. Jaffer & Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 314.
107. Paul Ohm, The Investigative Dynamics of the Use of Malware by Law Enforcement, 26
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 314–15, 331–32 (2017).
108. Courts have split on whether the government can assert a “law-enforcement privilege”
against disclosure of technical details of lawful hacking. See Jennifer Granick & Riana Pfefferkorn,
Government Hacking: Evidence and Vulnerability Disclosure in Court, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT
STAN. L. SCH. (May 23, 2017, 10:48 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/05/governmenthacking-evidence-and-vulnerability-disclosure-court [https://perma.cc/NH46-NDQZ ].
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These problems are compounded at the state and local levels.109 As noted
above,110 the tendency to think about law enforcement policy in terms of the federal
government obscures the fact that the vast majority of crime, and the vast majority
of law enforcement investigations, occur within the jurisdiction of the nearly 18,000
state, county, and local police departments and law-enforcement agencies across the
country.111 Your local police department—or even your state attorney general’s
office—is unlikely to have the expertise or resources to hack devices that have been
secured by the world’s most brilliant computer engineers working for the world’s
largest companies.112 Thus, even if lawful hacking satisfies the feds’ needs, it might
leave the vast bulk of the problem unsolved.113
The second problem with widespread lawful hacking is that it could have a
serious unintended consequence: it could, in certain cases, decrease device security.
When the government learns of a vulnerability in software or hardware, it has a
choice: it can either disclose that vulnerability to the product vendor in hopes that
the vendor will fix the vulnerability, or it can keep the vulnerability secret and use
the knowledge for its own purposes—for example, to hack devices that have the
vulnerability. The decision whether to disclose vulnerabilities is a complex one, and
it has led the government to adopt an interagency process by which vulnerabilities
are assessed and disclosure decisions are made.114 A full analysis of this process is
complex,115 but it’s safe to say that increased reliance on lawful hacking would
clearly incentivize the government to horde, rather than disclose, vulnerabilities.116

109.
110.
111.

See Kerr & Schneier, supra note 4, at 1015.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
DUREN BANKS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA 3 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/BV55-Q8YD ].
112. MANHATTAN DA REPORT, supra note 5, at 4–5.
113. The federal government, through the FBI’s National Domestic Communications
Assistance Center (NDCAC), provides state and local law-enforcement agencies with technical advice
(but not research and development or operational assistance). See NAT’L DOMESTIC COMMC’NS
ASSISTANCE CTR., https://ndcac.fbi.gov/ [ https://perma.cc/9Z5S-G2EV ] ( last visited June 6, 2019 ).
It is conceivable that NDCAC could expand and play a more direct role in state and local investigations
involving encrypted data and devices. However, this would require a dramatic increase in resources and
would unlikely address lower-priority investigations, for which the government would be unwilling to
use a lawful-hacking technique.
114. See VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES POLICY AND PROCESS FOR THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/
External%20-%20Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%20FINAL.PDF [ https://perma.cc/KJ7NMMN2 ].
115. See generally Tristan Caulfield et al., The U.S. Vulnerabilities Equities Process: An Economic
Perspective, Decision and Game Theory for Security, in DECISION AND GAME THEORY FOR SECURITY
131 (Stefan Rass et al. eds., 2017); Stephanie K. Pell & James Finocchiaro, The Ethical Imperative for a
Vulnerability Equities Process and How the Common Vulnerability Scoring System Can Aid That Process,
49 CONN. L. REV. 1549 (2017).
116. RIANA PFEFFERKORN, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT STAN. L. SCH., SECURITY RISKS
OF GOVERNMENT HACKING 3–5 (2018).
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Thus, advocates of lawful hacking should not to try to eat their cake and have
it too. For example, after the FBI gave up trying to force Apple to help unlock the
San Bernardino iPhone and instead used a third-party tool to gain access, Apple’s
lawyers reportedly considered ways to force the FBI to disclose information about
how the tool worked,117 many called on the FBI to voluntarily disclose the
information,118 and several news organizations sued unsuccessfully to find out the
name of the vendor.119 Some lawful-hacking supporters argue that the government
should have a “default obligation to report” vulnerabilities, “actively reporting and
working to fix even those vulnerabilities that it uses” for surveillance, on the theory
that there is always a “lead time” between when vulnerabilities are reported and
when they’re patched, and that new vulnerabilities will always be found “at a rate
that exceeds the rate at which they are repaired.”120 But there is no guarantee that
this will be the case, especially if the government makes lawful hacking the
centerpiece of its strategy to access otherwise technically inaccessible data.
Finally, lawful hacking will exacerbate the already wide divide between the
government on the one side and the technology industry and information-security
community on the other side. Lawful hacking incentivizes each side to be suspicious
of the other: the technology industry will (rightly) think that the government is
secretly trying to undermine the security of its products, and the government will
(rightly) think that the technology industry is not a partner but rather a target.
Consider how the technology industry responded when in 2017 WikiLeaks released
documents purporting to show that the CIA had “acquired an array of
cyberweapons that could be used to break into Apple and Android smartphones,
Windows computers, automotive computer systems, and even smart televisions to
conduct surveillance on unwitting users.”121 The CIA was angrily accused of
“stockpiling vulnerabilities” and undermining security for users around the world.122

117. Paresh Dave, Apple Wants the FBI to Reveal How It Hacked the San Bernardino Killer’s
iPhone, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016, 8:12 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tnapple-next-steps-20160330-story.html [ https://perma.cc/28E4-67NK ].
118. Sara Sorcher & Malena Carollo, Influencers: FBI Should Disclose San Bernardino iPhone
Security Hole to Apple, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Passcode/Passcode-Influencers/2016/0324/Influencers-FBI-should-disclose-SanBernardino-iPhone-security-hole-to-Apple [ https://perma.cc/N88F-6693 ].
119. See Associated Press v. FBI, 265 F. Supp. 3d 82 (D.D.C. 2017).
120. See Bellovin et al., supra note 35, at 55.
121. Vindu Goel & Nick Wingfield, WikiLeaks Reignites Tensions Between Silicon Valley and
Spy Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/technology/
wikileaks-silicon-valley-spy-agencies.html [https://perma.cc/ZRX5-6NX7]
122. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brad Smith, The Need for Urgent Collective
Action to Keep People Safe Online: Lessons from Last Week’s Cyberattack, MICROSOFT (May 14, 2017),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/05/14/need-urgent-collective-action-keeppeople-safe-online-lessons-last-weeks-cyberattack [ https://perma.cc/LE5K-CXJX ].
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Exacerbating the “suit-hoodie”123 divide between the government and Silicon
Valley will only make it harder to solve not just the problem of law-enforcement
access to encrypted data but cybersecurity issues more generally.124
In pointing out these drawbacks I do not mean to suggest that lawful hacking
is an inappropriate answer—at least in some cases—to the problem of lawenforcement access to encrypted data. In particular, lawful hacking will remain
indispensable to investigations into criminal activity on the “dark web.”125 It will
also be an important tool where suspects use products or services that are outside
the scope of any exceptional-access mandates (for example, one of the many
internationally produced secure messaging services). Rather, the point is that the
best we can often do is to put forward partial proposals and focus on minimizing
their flaws, in the hope that, flaws and all, they will nevertheless represent an
incremental improvement over where things stand today.
C. Invest in Knowledge Production126
At the core of the encryption debate lie several factual questions: To what
extent does encryption stymie government investigations? What level of access does
the government want technology companies to provide, and across what platforms
and systems? Most importantly, to what extent would providing such access degrade
information security? These are of course not the only relevant questions, and some
important additional questions are about values, not facts: Should we make it easier
for the government to engage in surveillance? Assuming that government access
will necessarily degrade information security by some amount, how much is too
much? But we can’t make meaningful progress on the value questions until we get
our facts straight.
Congress could do much to help generate the answers we need. It could use a
combination of carrots (increased funding) and sticks (legislative mandates) to
require federal, state, and local agencies to keep detailed statistics on situations in
which encryption impeded government investigations. In the wake of reports that
the FBI seriously overestimated the number of encrypted devices it could not
access,127 laws requiring more accurate reporting are in order. Congress could also

123. Amy Zegart, Policymakers Are from Mars, Tech Company Engineers Are from Venus,
LAWFARE ( June 6, 2016, 9:54 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/policymakers-are-mars-techcompany-engineers-are-venus [ https://perma.cc/43Y6-VLBN ].
124. See, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 522–24
(2017) (describing botnet takedowns as an example of successful public-private cybersecurity
cooperation).
125. See Ghappour, supra note 101, at 1095–99.
126. This and portions of the next section are closely adapted from Alan Z. Rozenshtein,
Mayank Varia & Charles Wright, How Congress Can De-Escalate the Second Crypto War: Fund Research
and Broker a Crypto Armistice, LAWFARE ( June 5, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
how-congress-can-de-escalate-second-crypto-war-fund-research-and-broker-crypto-armistice [ https:/
/perma.cc/BV2D-UW7L ]. I am grateful to Mayank and Charles for helping me develop these ideas.
127. See Barrett, supra note 28.
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require agencies to keep data on how the government responded to encryption (for
example, by dropping the investigation, using different investigative techniques, or
defeating the encryption, whether through its own lawful hacking or the purchase
of third-party tools), and it could require agencies to specify and prioritize what
capabilities they need.
Congress could also directly fund research into whether secure exceptionalaccess systems are possible. Perhaps stung by the failure of the governmentdeveloped Clipper Chip during the 1990s, the government has studiously avoided
putting forward any concrete proposals of its own, instead arguing that only the
technology community is capable of the relevant research. But this undersells the
government’s role. From the beginning of the Internet—which, after all, started as
a Defense Department project—to the present day, the government has played a
key role in technological innovation, and there’s no reason why this situation should
be any different. Indeed, to use FBI Director Wray’s own reference to autonomous
vehicles,128 the government-sponsored DARPA Grand Challenges during the 2000s
stimulated much of the foundational work in this field.
There are several avenues by which Congress could invest in relevant
knowledge generation. Agencies that fund basic science research could administer
new challenges to develop viable options and to understand fundamental
limitations. Exchange programs could send technologists from the private sector
and the academy into the government to help think through the technological and
policy issues around exceptional access. Eventually, cryptographic standards
organizations could hold a competition to evaluate the security of exceptional access
systems, just as occurred with the now broadly supported Advanced Encryption
Standard129 and Cryptographic Hash Algorithm.130
None of this will result in viable exceptional-access systems overnight. It is
important to recognize that, whether with driverless cars or realistic virtual reality
(Wray’s examples of Silicon Valley innovation), it took years—sometimes
decades—to develop the technologies, which even now remain works in progress.
Secure exceptional-access systems may similarly be years away from viability. That
doesn’t mean we should skimp on the necessary research and development, just that
we should have a realistic timetable in mind and start as early as possible.
D. Improve Relationships Between the Government and the Technology Community
Underlying many approaches to managing wicked problems is the need to
foster a more collaborative, rather than combative, relationship between the various
stakeholders. This is important for at least two reasons. First, because information
128. See Wray, supra note 75 and accompanying text.
129. AES Development, NIST, https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-standards-andguidelines/archived-crypto-projects/aes-development [ https://perma.cc/8CFV-VBDG ] ( last visited
June 6, 2019 ).
130. SHA-3 Project, NIST, https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/hash-functions/sha-3-project
[ https://perma.cc/4LWE-K7FW ] (last visited June 6, 2019 ).
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and expertise are diffuse, the best answers rely on cooperation. Second, because
wicked problems involve tradeoffs among legitimate values, compromise is
necessary.
Unfortunately, the relationship between the government and the technology
sector is at a nadir. One of the most pernicious features of debates on government
surveillance is the pronounced us-versus-them tribalism. This has a host of
unhelpful effects when it comes to collaborative problem solving, but a singularly
toxic one is each side’s lack of respect for the other’s highest values. For example,
the government frequently downplays the extent to which the information-security
community—in both the private and academic sectors—feels an overriding duty to
protect the information of its users. Conversely, when surveillance skeptics dismiss
government arguments as based on exaggerations about the “Four Horsemen of
the Infopocalypse” (terrorists, drug dealers, pedophiles, and organized criminals),
they ignore law enforcement’s strongly felt duty to protect society against these
threats. As the psychologist Philip Tetlock has explained, blindness to the other
side’s values can lead to “taboo trade-offs,” in which one side trivializes the other
side’s values, leading to failed negotiation, even worsened inter-group relationships,
and a corresponding digging in by each side into its positions.
Fortunately, such conflicts can be repaired. Tetlock’s research suggests that
where “taboo trade-offs” are reframed as “tragic trade-offs”—ones that forthrightly
recognize that legitimate values on all sides have come into conflict—and where the
decision-maker “linger[s] over a tragic trade-off . . . emphasiz[ing] the gravity of the
issues at stake,” the moral outrage that taboo trade-offs spark can be defused.131 In
the best case, the process of working together can help participants forge a new,
shared group identity—a “community of interest” that transcends participants’ preexisting group interests and gets them to think in terms of what is good for all
members.132
When thinking about techniques to improve or repair relationships, it is useful
to divide them into two categories: first, those that affirmatively improve
relationship, and, second, those that remove existing impediments to healthy
relationships.
In the first category, the support for research advocated above would certainly
help. If security researchers try to develop secure third-party access systems—even
if they ultimately decide that such systems are infeasible—they will naturally develop
some appreciation for the government’s legitimate need to access encrypted data.
131. Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions,
7 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 320, 322 (2003).
132. See Nancy Roberts, Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution, 1 INT’L
PUB. MGMT. REV. 1, 14 (2000); cf. Hill, supra note 43, at 529 (“Consensus is arguably the best guide for
what society should encourage firms to do . . . .”). The importance of negotiation “in good faith” and
where the parties “remain open to learning” is a key feature of other forms of consensus-based socialpolicy formation, as in much of contemporary public-law litigation. Charles F. Sabel & William
H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1068
(2004).
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Conversely, if law enforcement feels that the technology community is trying in
good faith to solve their problem, they will be more inclined to believe when told
that a particular solution won’t work. And to the extent that government-funded
research brings together individuals from the technology community and the
government—whether through research grants, innovation challenges, or exchange
programs—the personal relationship will help break down the us-versus-them
group identities that make cooperation that much harder. Familiarity breeds
friendliness more than contempt.
In the second category, the government should stop trying to force a
resolution to the problem—particularly one that favors law enforcement—given
the lack of even a partial consensus that a satisfactory technological solution exists.
No amount of collaboration will do the trick if the technology community believes
that the government is poised to force insecure or unvetted “backdoors” into
encrypted products and services.
Of all the ways that government attempts to force the technological
community to comply can backfire, the best example is the FBI’s 2016 attempt to
use a court order to force Apple to modify the operating system of the iPhone of
one of the San Bernardino terrorists. There are many reasons why the government’s
strategy was, at least in hindsight, ill-advised. First, it is not clear whether the law
the government relied on, the All Writs Act,133 actually authorized the court to issue
the government’s desired order.134 Second, courts have limited technical expertise
and are thus ill-suited to making the technical judgments that are necessary to decide
whether a government demand for technical assistance is appropriate. Third, courts,
which must decide on the individual government request before them, are ill-placed
to consider the system-wide effects of their decisions. While the government
emphasized that its request was limited to one phone, Apple and others correctly
pointed out that, were Apple to build the capability that the government wanted, it
would open the floodgates to similar assistance requests from law-enforcement
agencies across the country. In addition, such dynamics would encourage forum
shopping by the government, which could go from court to court until it found one
willing to impose an assistance order, which would then effectively apply
nationwide.
But the biggest drawback of having the courts settle the encryption issue is the
effect that litigation has on the participants. The adversarial nature of litigation
encourages each side to take maximalist positions and rhetorically demonize the

133. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1651).
134. This was the main point of contention between the government and Apple in the litigation
before the court. A different court had earlier held that the All Writs Act did not grant it power to issue
a far less burdensome iPhone-unlocking assistance order to Apple. See In re Order Requiring Apple,
Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by This Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 376
(E.D.N.Y. 2016); see also Rozenshtein, supra note 32, at 125–28.
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other, rather than work together. In the iPhone litigation, the government
characterized Apple’s use of unbreakable encryption as a “marketing decision to
engineer its products so that the government cannot search them, even with a
warrant,”135 while Apple accused the government of trying to violate its
constitutional rights.136 And in a high-profile statement that Apple CEO Tim Cook
published on the company’s home page, he accused the FBI of “undermin[ing] the
very freedoms and liberty our government is meant to protect.”137
Just as importantly, the litigation also polarized the larger technology
community. The litigation attracted over a dozen amicus briefs on Apple’s side,
covering virtually every sector of the technology community: Apple’s Silicon Valley
competitors; leading civil-society organizations like the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation; and dozens of technologists,
researchers, and cryptographers.138 This was predictable; group tensions rise—and
the possibility for cooperation correspondingly lowers—when one group feels that
its core values are under attack. And in Silicon Valley, where encryption has come
to symbolize Silicon Valley’s commitment to its users’ information security and its
opposition to government surveillance, few moves by the government would so
obviously inflame as a top-down effort to restrict encryption, whether through
litigation, legislation, or regulation.
Ultimately, the government will be better served if it recognizes that, until
there is an (at minimum partial) consensus among technologists that secure thirdparty access is possible, no top-down mandate will be possible. Until then, the
government may be best off supporting an armistice that takes design mandates off
the table.
A 2018 bipartisan bill in the House of Representatives provides one model of
what a crypto-armistice might look like. The “Secure Data Act of 2018,” would
prohibit any regulations or court orders (other than those already permitted under
the law) that would require a company “to design or alter the security functions in
its product or service to allow the surveillance of any user of such product or service,
or to allow the physical search of such product” by the government.139 By removing
the specter of exceptional-access design mandates, the bill might actually make it

135. Government’s Reply in Support of Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s
Motion to Vacate Order at 1, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search
Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. 5:16-cm-00010-SP (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016).
136. See Apple Inc’s [sic] Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, and Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance at 32–34, In re Search of an
Apple iPhone.
137. See Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, A PPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), https://
www.apple.com/customer-letter [ https://perma.cc/RD7V-UCNG ].
138. For a full list of the amicus filings and letters supporting Apple, see Press Release,
Apple Inc., Amicus Briefs in Support of Apple (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/
2016/03/03Amicus-Briefs-in-Support-of-Apple [ https://perma.cc/C2Q8-7F5C ].
139. Secure Data Act of 2018, H.R. 5823, 115th Cong. § 2(b) (2018).
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more likely that research on secure exceptional access goes forward (whether or not
that was the intention of the bill’s sponsors).
To be clear, the bill has serious flaws. It unnecessarily goes far beyond
encryption, prohibiting design modifications that may pose no security threats. It is
permanent, when instead a time-limited bill (for example with a sunset provision
after some number of years) might better ensure that the issue remains on
Congress’s radar. And it misses an opportunity to fund and otherwise support
research. But it is nevertheless a useful thought experiment as to how a pause in
hostilities between the government and technology sector may be in everybody’s
interest—and in particular why the government may want to support such an
armistice.
CONCLUSION
The point of this Article is not to advance a particular technological or policy
solution to the problem of law-enforcement access to encrypted data. It is possible
that no adequate solution exists. Instead, this Article has attempted to explain why
the problem is both real and difficult, and to suggest conceptual approaches and
institutional designs that, while they may not be able to solve the problem in the
near future, can continue the conversation along a constructive path. That is of
course well short of a solution, but, when it comes to wicked problems, it is often
the best one.
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